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Residual State Ownership, Foreign Ownership and 
Firms’ Financing Patterns 
 
Yu Liu1 and Jian Xu2 
 
Abstract 
 Employing the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) dataset, which covers over 
130 thousand firms in 139 economies from 2006 to 2017, we investigate the effect of 
residual state ownership, with or without the moderating effect of foreign ownership, 
on firms’ financing patterns. First, we find that residual state ownership is positively 
related with a firm’s external finance, and foreign ownership is negatively related with 
a firm’s external finance. Second, residual state ownership’s positive effect on external 
finance disappears when foreign ownership and the interaction of the two are taken into 
consideration. The positive effect of the state-foreign interaction on a firm’s external 
finance is both statistically and economically significant. The increased external finance 
of firms with both state and foreign ownerships mainly comes from private banks and 
new equity. Finally, we explore the channels through which residual state ownership or 
foreign ownership affect firms’ financing patterns. Firms with residual state ownership 
only or foreign ownership only do not actively expand in market or innovate. While 
firms with both state and foreign ownerships are engaging in market expansion and 
innovation eagerly.  
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1. Introduction 
We examine the effect of residual state ownership, with or without the moderating 
effect from foreign ownership, on firms’ financing patterns in this study.  
Over the past 30 years, privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a 
widespread phenomenon in developed, developing and emerging economies. More than 
100 countries have implemented different levels of privatization for SOEs (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Privatization has decreased the role of state in the economies, as 
many previously state-controlled firms have reduced their state shares from majority to 
minority, or sometime to zero (Megginson, 2010).  
Understanding whether and how residual state ownership affect firms’ financing 
patterns is important, given the widespread government bailouts happened during the 
recent financial crisis and the return of government control in several important 
developing countries, such as China, Russia and Brazil (Wooldridge, 2012). Moreover, 
many governments are reluctant to give up control on their residual state ownership. 
These governments either choose to retain a percentage of shares which is higher than 
a threshold or appoint representatives to the key positions in firms (Boubakri, Cosset 
and Guedhami, 2009).  
A large volume of literature has examined the relationship between SOEs and firm 
behaviors. State ownership is generally associated with better government support, 
lower financing obstacles, and less cost of debt (Kornai, 1979; Kornai, 1980; Harrison 
and McMillan, 2003; Laeven, 2003; Borisova and Megginson, 2011). However, we do 
not know whether firms with residual state ownership continue to behave that way as 
SOEs do. 
The impacts of foreign ownership on firm performance or firm decisions are well 
studied. Foreign ownership is related with lower financial constraints (Beck et al., 2006; 
Dong and Men, 2014; D'Souza et al., 2017; Mertzanis, 2017), better corporate 
governance (Doidge et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 2008), less agency problems and more 
informative disclosures (Boycko et al., 1996; Dyck, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2007; 
Guedhami et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2011).  
State ownership and foreign ownership are examined separately in most of the 
ownership studies. A few studies have examined the impacts of both state and foreign 
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ownerships on firm decisions.2 No study has directly explored the interaction effect 
between state and foreign ownerships. The interaction effect between state and foreign 
ownerships is important because we are interested to know whether the resources 
integration synergies between the two ownerships outweigh the coordination costs 
between them. Organizations controlled by sharing ownership play a significant role in 
economic, political and social institutions (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). The partners 
may decide to cooperate if they share control equally, when both partners have assets 
that are essential for collaboration (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). 
Mantecon et al. (2012) find that monitoring in joint ownership organizations reduces 
the possibility of value-destroying corporate decisions. 
To the best of our knowledge, no study in previous literature has analyzed the effect 
of residual state ownership on firms’ financing patterns, and whether foreign ownership 
moderates this state-financing effect.  
We examine three questions in this study:  
1. Does residual state ownership affect firms’ financing patterns? 
2. Does foreign ownership moderate the state-financing relationship? 
3. What are the channels that state and/or foreign ownerships affect firms’ 
financing patterns? 
We answer the three questions by analyzing the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES) database, which covers over 130,000 firms, from 139 countries, from 2006 to 
2017. To simplify our ownership descriptions, we define firms with residual state 
ownership as State firms, firms with foreign ownership as Foreign firms, firms with 
both residual state ownership and foreign ownership as State_Foreign firms, and firms 
with neither residual state ownership nor foreign ownership as Non_State_Foreign 
firms. 
First, residual state ownership and foreign ownership are included in our regressions 
separately. Firms with residual state ownership tend to have higher external finance, 
while firms with foreign ownership tend to have lower external finance. (Dong and Men, 
2014; Knack and Xu, 2017; Liu et al., 2019). We alleviate the potential endogeneity issue 
between ownership and external finance by using two-stage least squares, propensity 
                                                 
2 See Ben-Nasr (2016), Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2013), Chen, et al. (2017) and Guedhami, Pittman 
and Saffar (2009).  
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score matching, and Heckman selection model. The main results stated above generally 
hold in the endogeneity tests.  
Second, residual state ownership, foreign ownership and the interaction between the 
two are simultaneously included in the regression. State firms’ positive effect on 
external finance disappears while Foreign Firms’ negative effect on external finance 
remains. Meanwhile, the positive effect of State_Foreign firms on a firm’s external 
finance is both statistically and economically significant. The increased external finance 
of State_Foreign firms mainly comes from privately-owned bank finance and new 
equity finance. These results are robust to including firm-level finance, political and 
court obstacles, replacing country fixed effects with country-level macroeconomic 
variables, limiting the regression to the top 10 countries with the highest percent of 
State firms, limiting the regression to firms with 100 or more employees (large firms 
according to WBES), using alterative dependent variables.  
Third, we explore two channels through which residual state ownership and/or 
foreign ownerships affect firms’ financing patterns. Firms with residual state ownership 
only or foreign ownership only do not show strong evidence that they are actively 
expanding or innovating. However, State_Foreign firms reveal strong evidence that 
they are eagerly engaging in market expansion and innovation.  
Our contributions to the literature are fourfold. First, we add to the literature on 
ownership and firm behaviors. The financing patterns of residual state ownership, 
foreign ownership and the interaction of the two, are analyzed simultaneously, while 
previous literature mainly focuses on one type of the ownership each time. Our results 
indicate that the combination and interaction of different ownerships are meaningful, 
as residual state ownership is positively related with external finance by itself, but 
insignificantly related with external finance when foreign ownership and the interaction 
of the two are included in the regression.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature of business collaborations. We are 
the first to examine the interacting effects between state and foreign ownerships. If 
synergies between the two types of owners outweigh their coordinating costs, firms 
with residual state ownership would benefit from foreign direct investment. The 
positive effects of State_Foreign firms on external finance, market expansion and 
innovation provide some support to the statement above. 
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Third, we propose an explanation to the positive effects of State_Foreign firms on 
external finance both from the demand side and the supply side. From the demand side, 
State_Foreign firms may have a higher demand on external finance due to their 
eagerness to expand and innovate. From the supply side, State_Foreign firms may tap 
into the financial resources from both types of owners, especially from their foreign 
owners. Our results indicate that the increased external finance of State_Foreign firms 
mainly comes from private banks and new equity.  
 Last but not least, our results provide an ownership-financing evidence from a 
dataset with over 130 countries, which primarily focuses on non-listed firms in 
developing or emerging economies. Previous literature mainly examines listed firms in 
developed countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Borisova and Megginson, 2011; Lin et 
al.,  2011), or listed firms in a few developing countries, such as China, Vietnam et al. 
(Maksimovic and Demirgüç-Kunt, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Cull and Xu, 2005; 
Megginson et al.,  2014). The results generated from developed countries or a few 
leading developing countries may not generalize to other developing or emerging 
economies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
generates hypotheses. Section 3 briefly describes the data and variables used in this 
study. Sections 4 and 5 present empirical results of the ownership-financing 
relationship. Section 6 explores the channels through which residual state ownership or 
foreign ownership affect financing patterns. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Residual State Ownership and Finance Patterns 
The relationship between state ownership and external finance is likely to be 
positive considering that SOEs naturally enjoy the benefits of all kinds of government 
support. The soft budget constraint theory (Kornai, 1979; Kornai, 1980) states that 
governments can relax SOEs’ financial constraint by offering them a favorable tax rate, 
an easier access to credit, and other support. Consistent with the soft budget constraint, 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) and Laeven (2003) find that SOEs have lower financing 
obstacles since they receive direct subsidies from governments and funds with 
favorable terms from state-owned banks. Borisova and Megginson (2011) identify a 
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negative link between government ownership and the cost of debt using a sample of 
newly privatized firms.  
Moreover, SOEs tend to possess more political connections (Boubakri et al., 2008). 
Faccio et al. (2006) report that firms with political connections are more likely to get 
an implicit government bailout guarantee during financial distress. Boubakri et al. 
(2012) find that a government official on board is associated with a higher leverage. 
Chaney et al. (2011) identify that firms with political connections have a lower cost of 
borrowing even if their financial reports are of poor quality. Boubakri et al. (2012) find 
that political connections reduce equity costs. Cull et al. (2015) argue that firms with 
government connections face fewer financial constraints, and investments in these firms 
are less sensitive to internal cash flows.  
However, the relationship between state ownership and external finance can also be 
negative considering that SOEs are notorious for their low efficiency and higher agency 
cost (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Boycko et al., 1996; Fogel et al., 2008; Guedhami et 
al., 2009). They do not have an easier access to loans from privately-owned banks as 
they do from state-owned banks (Liu et al., 2019). Dong et al. (2016) report that SOEs 
no longer have an easier access to bank finance in China, which is different from the 
traditional prediction. Lin and Bo (2012) also indicate that state ownership does not 
equal lower financial constraints or more borrowing from banks in China. The soft 
budget constraint once enjoyed by SOEs or former SOEs may have gradually dissipated 
with a country’s privatization process and its advancement of market economy.   
Firms with residual state ownership are likely to behave similar to SOEs (Chen et 
al., 2011; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012; Boubakri et al., 2013; and Chen et al., 2017). These 
firms may also benefit from the soft budget constraint and suffer from the exacerbated 
agency issue. Following the discussion above, we make the following two hypotheses:  
H1a: Residual state ownership is positively related with external finance. 
H1b: Residual state ownership is negatively related with external finance. 
 
2.2. Foreign Ownership and Financing Patterns 
The relationship between foreign ownership and external finance is also ambiguous 
according to previous literature. Foreign ownership is commonly associated with lower 
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financial constraints (Beck et al., 2006; Dong and Men, 2014; D'Souza et al., 2017; and 
Mertzanis, 2017), better corporate governance, less agency problems and more 
informative disclosures (Boycko et al., 1996; Dyck, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2007; Doidge 
et al., 2009; Guedhami et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Equipped 
with low financial constraints and better governance, firms with foreign ownership are 
valuable loan applicants from banks’ perspective and they may have an easier access to 
external funding.   
Moreover, Ayyagari et al. (2011) find that foreign ownership is related with a higher 
probability of innovation. Boubakri et al. (2013) present that foreign ownership is 
positively related with a firm’s risk-taking behavior. With a higher incentive to innovate 
and take risks, firms with foreign ownership tend to have a higher demand for external 
finance.  
Think from a different perspective, less financial obstacles indicate that firms with 
foreign ownership do not need that much external finance. Beck et al. (2008) show that 
foreign-owned firms fund a large share of investment with equity finance. Kwok and 
Tadesse (2006), Barth et al. (2009), and Houston et al. (2011) argue that firms with 
foreign ownership have less bank lending since they obtain funds from parent 
companies and foreign capital markets.  
Firms with foreign ownership may also suffer from less connections with domestic 
banks, be it state-owned or privately-owned. Hence there is no guarantee that the fund 
supply from domestic banks/suppliers to foreign firms are positive. Colombo (2001) 
find that foreign ownership has no significant effect on access to short-term debt finance 
for a sample of Hungary firms. Knack and Xu (2017) document a negative relationship 
between foreign ownership and external finance. Liu et al. (2019) find firms with 
foreign ownership receive less bank finance, either from state-owned banks or 
privately-owned banks.  
Based on the discussion above, we hypothesize that:  
H2a: Foreign ownership is positively related with external finance.  
H2b: Foreign ownership is negatively related with external finance.  
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2.3 Coexistence of State-Foreign Ownerships and Financing Patterns 
The coexistence of state and foreign ownerships in one firm may positively affect 
its external finance. Firms with (previous) state ownership tend to have built-up links 
with state-owned banks and suppliers (Liu et al. 2019). Firms with foreign ownership 
tend to have an easier access to equity funding from their foreign parent companies or 
foreign capital markets (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Barth et al., 2009; and Houston et 
al., 2011). Firms with both state and foreign ownerships may hence inherit the financing 
advantages from both side of the owners. Related literature has reported that in 
privatized firms, foreign ownership is associated with better firm performance and 
investment efficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Estrin et al., 2009; D’Souza et al., 2001; and Chen et al., 2017). 
On the other hand, the coexistence of state and foreign ownerships in one firm may 
negatively affect its external finance. It is well documented that state owners and 
foreign owners have vastly different incentives when they are making business 
decisions (Ben-Nasr, 2016; Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar, 2013; Chen, et al., 2017; and 
Guedhami, Pittman and Saffar, 2009). The cost of coordinating activities is higher in 
joint ventures than wholly owned affiliates (Desai et al. 2004). State_Foreign firms may 
be plagued by conflicting interests and coordinating costs, hence unable to take 
advantage of any type of financing resources from state/foreign owners.  
H3a: The coexistence of state-foreign ownership is positively related with external 
finance. 
H3b: The coexistence of state-foreign ownership is negatively related with external 
finance. 
 
3. Data  
3.1. The Sample 
In this study, we employ the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) database for 
our empirical analysis (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/). This dataset was collected 
through surveys between 2006 and 2017 across Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia & 
Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North 
Africa and South Asia. WBES dataset uses standardized survey instruments to measure 
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the business climate of each economy. It is widely used in corporate finance studies 
(see, e.g. Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008; Ayyagari et al., 2008, 2011, 2014; Barth 
et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011; Akins et al., 2017). 
WBES has its unique advantages that make it suitable to study the relationship 
between firm ownership and financing patterns. First, WBES contains in-depth firm-
level financing pattern information. Second, it covers over 130 developing and 
emerging countries around the world.  
WBES also has its shortcomings. One shortcoming is that financial data are 
generally missing in this dataset. Many important financial measures, such total asset, 
total equity, net profit, are not available. Another shortcoming is that the dataset is a 
pooled one and we cannot perform panel regressions at the firm level.  
To reduce the impact of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top 
and the bottom one percentile. Dependent variables (financing patterns, financing 
channel proxies for market expansion and innovation), key independent variables 
(residual state ownership and foreign ownership), and control variables are briefly 
described in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.  
 
3.2. Dependent Variables 
3.2.1 Financing Patterns 
A firm’s financing pattern is measured by its answers to the question: “Over fiscal 
year [insert last complete fiscal year], please estimate the proportion of this 
establishment’s purchase of fixed assets that was financed from each of the following 
sources?” The firms’ purchase of fixed assets can be financed by internal 
funds/retained earnings (Fixed_Internal), funds borrowed from banks (Fixed_Bank), 
which equals the sum of funds from state-owned banks (Fixed_StateBank) and 
privately-owned banks (Fixed_PrivateBank), funds borrowed from non-bank financial 
institutions (Fixed_NonBank), purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from 
customers (Fixed_Suppliers), other informal sources, e.g. moneylenders, friends, 
relatives (Fixed_Other), and owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 
(Fixed_NewEquity). These funding channels add up to 100%. We further define 
Fixed_External as 100 minus Fixed_Internal.  
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Several supplementary measures of a firm’s financing pattern are used in our 
robustness tests. Another question related to a firm’s financing pattern is “Over fiscal 
year [insert last complete fiscal year], please estimate the proportion of this 
establishment’s working capital that was financed from each of the following sources?” 
The firms’ working capital can be financed by internal funds/retained earnings 
(WC_Internal), funds borrowed from banks (WC_Bank) and non-bank financial 
institutions (WC_NonBank), purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from 
customers (WC_Suppliers), and other informal sources, e.g. moneylenders, friends, 
relatives (WC_Other). The above specified funding channels add up to 100%. Similarly, 
we define WC_External as 100 minus WC_Internal. Moreover, Line_of_Credit is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a line of credit or a loan from any 
financial institution, zero otherwise. New_Loan is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm has applied for a new loan or a line of credit in year t-1, zero otherwise. 
Table 1, Panel A demonstrates that for firms with fixed assets purchase, 33.20% of 
the purchase was financed from external funds, among which 18.24% from bank 
borrowing, 1.82% from non-bank financial institutions, 5.17% from suppliers, 2.47% 
from other sources, and 4.20 % from new equity. A firm’s working capitals is 28.90% 
externally financed on average. Specifically, 12.99% of working capital is financed 
from bank borrowing, 1.31% from non-bank financial institutions, 11.72% from 
suppliers, and 2.78% from other sources. In our sample, 35.92% of the firms have an 
existing loan or a line of credit, 27.87% of the firms have applied for a new loan or a 
line of credit in year t-1.  
 
3.2.2 Financing Channels Proxies 
We also investigate the channels through which a firm may spend its externally 
acquired funds. One potential channel related to cash outflow is market expansion. We 
use three variables to proxy a firm’s market expansion process and they are: 
Sales_Growth, which is defined as (ln(Salest-1) - ln(Salest-3)) / 2, Employee_Growth, 
which is defined as (ln(Employeet-1) - ln(Employeet-3)) / 2, and Fixed_Dummy, which 
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is dummy variable that equals one if the firm has purchased any fixed assets in year t-
1, zero otherwise.3  
Another potential channel related to cash outflow is innovation. We use the 
following three variables to proxy a firm’s innovation effort.  New_Product is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm introduced new products/services over the last 3 
years, zero otherwise. Improved_Process is the dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm introduced a new/significantly improved process during the last 3 years, zero 
otherwise. R&D is a dummy variable that equals one if the establishment spent on R&D 
in year t-1, zero otherwise. 
The mean (median) of Sales_Growth is 0.14 (0.09), and the mean (median) of 
Employee_Growth is 0.05 (0). The mean-median gap indicates that both variables are 
right skewed. 44.54% of the firms have purchased fixed assets in year t-1. As to 
innovation, 40.55%, 43.37%, and 22.54% of firms have launched new 
products/services, introduced new/significantly improved process, or invested on R&D, 
in year t-1, respectively. See Table 1, Panel B for details.   
 
3.3. State and Foreign Ownerships 
We define State as a dummy variable that equals one if any governmental agency 
has at least partial ownership in the firm, zero otherwise, Foreign as a dummy variable 
that equals one if any private foreign individual/company has at least partial ownership 
in the firm, zero otherwise (Beck et al., 2005, Beck et al., 2008, Akins et al., 2017, and 
Ullah and Wei, 2017). We further define State_Foreign as an interaction dummy 
between State and Foreign, which equals one if both state and foreign ownerships co-
exist in the firm, zero otherwise.  
Table 1, Panel C shows that 2% (11%) of the sample firms have state (foreign) 
ownership. Among the 2% State firms, 66.17% of which are 50% or less state-owned, 
36.25% of which are 20% or less state-owned. Hence in the world level, we are dealing 
with residual state ownership.  
                                                 
3 We define Sales_Growth and Employee_Growth following D'Souza et al. (2017) and Ullah and Wei 
(2017).  
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The distribution of state and foreign ownership varies significantly by firm size. 
WBES allocates firms into three categories according to their size: small firms have 
less than 20 employees, medium firms have 21-99 employees, and large firms have 100 
or more employees. 4% (23%) of large firms have state (foreign) ownership, while only 
1% (8%) of small/medium firms have state (foreign) ownership.  
Figure 1 exhibits the state and foreign ownership distribution by regions. Firms in 
Europe & Central Asia are much more likely to have state ownership (2.64 %), while 
firms in Latin America & Caribbean are least likely to have state ownership (0.39 %). 
16.83% of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa have foreign ownership, which is the highest 
among regions, while 1.96% of firms in South Asia have foreign ownership, which is 
the lowest among regions.  
 [Insert Table1 here] 
[Inert Figure 1 here] 
3.4. Control Variables  
Following the literature, we include a set of control variables in our regressions 
(Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008; Ullah and Wei, 2017; Allison et al. 2019). A top 
manager's working experience is proxied by the years he/she spent in the business-
related sector (Experience). Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of permanent full-time employees (Ln_Employee). Firm age is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the survey year minus the founding year plus one (Ln_FirmAge). 
Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of the firm owned by its largest 
shareholder (Top_Owner_Pct). The public listing status is proxied by a dummy variable 
called Public. The exporting status of a firm is proxied by a dummy variable called 
Exporter. A set of location variables are also included in our analysis. City_Xlarge, 
City_Large, City_Medium and City_Small are dummy variables which equal one if the 
city that the firm located has population over 1 million, over 250,000 to 1 million, over 
50,000 to 250,000, or less than 50,000, respectively. City_Large, City_Medium and 
City_Small are directly included in the regression while City_Xlarge is held as the 
default category.  
Firm level finance, political and court obstacles are controlled in some robustness 
test. Finance_Obstacle is based on the firm's response to the question “how much of an 
obstacle: access to finance?” (0-no obstacle, 1-minor obstacle, 2-moderate obstacle, 3-a 
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major obstacle, 4-very severe obstacle). Political_Obstacle is used to measure “how much 
of an obstacle: political instability?” (0-no obstacle, 1-minor obstacle, 2-moderate 
obstacle, 3-a major obstacle, 4-very severe obstacle). Court_Obstacle is used to measure 
“how much of an obstacle: courts?” (0-no obstacle, 1-minor obstacle, 2-moderate obstacle, 
3-a major obstacle, 4-very severe obstacle). 
County level macro-economic variables are used in some other robustness test. We 
include the natural logarithm of a country’s GDP (Ln_GDP), the growth rate of GDP 
(GDP_Growth), GDP per capita (GDP_per_Capita), and inflation rate (Inflation), 
following Beck et al. (2005) and Zheng et al. (2013).  
In our sample, a firm’s top manager has 17.35 years of working experience on 
average. The means of Ln_Employee and Ln_FirmAge are 3.25 and 2.69, respectively, 
which indicates that an average firm has 25.79 employees and is 14.73 years old. The 
percent of the firm owned by the largest shareholder is 79.28%. 4.97% of firms are 
listed, and 21.27 % of firms are exporters. As to the location of the firms, 38.34%, 
27.96%, 19.7% and 14% of the firms located in extra-large, large, medium and small 
cities, accordingly. The means of Finance_Obstacle, Political_Obstacle, and 
Court_Obstacle are 1.49, 1.63, and 0.98, respectively. The means of a country’s natural 
logarithm of GDP (Ln_GDP) and GDP per capita (GDP_per_Capita), are 25.27 and 
8.00, respectively. An average country’s growth rate of GDP is 4.65%, and the average 
inflation rate is7.32%.  
Appendix 1 provides a summary of definitions and sources of all variables used in 
this study.  
 
3.5 Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix among our main dependent and independent variables are 
presented in Table 2. Fixed_External is positively correlated with State, negatively 
correlated with Foreign. Among the independent variables, not any two variables have 
a correlation higher than 0.35. Multicollinearity is not likely to be a major issue in our 
regressions.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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4. Ownership and Financing Patterns  
4.1. Main Regression and Results 
In this section, we examine the effects of state and foreign ownership on financing 
patterns by using the following regression model: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝛽6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀                                         (1) 
where 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 is proxied by Fixed_External, the percent of the firm's 
fixed assets funded by external financing. State, Foreign, State_Foreign are our key 
independent variables. Firm Level Controls denote a set of firm-level control variables 
(Experience, Ln_Employee, Ln_FirmAge, Top_Owner_Pct, Public, Exporter, 
City_Large, City_Medium and City_Small). Country_Industry Dummies and Year 
Dummies represent country times industry and year fixed effects, respectively. We 
further cluster standard errors at the country-industry level to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity problems. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. In Equation (1), we focus on the coefficients 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3.  
Table 3 reports regression results of Equation (1). State is positively related with 
Fixed_External, see Columns (1) and (3). Yet its positive effect becomes insignificant 
when State_Foreign is included, see Column (4). Foreign is negatively related with 
Fixed_External, see Columns (2), (3) and (4). The coefficients of Foreign remain 
relatively stable in different regressions (Dong and Men, 2014; Knack and Xu, 2017; Liu 
et al., 2019). 
State_Foreign is positively related with Fixed_External, see Column (4). The 
State_Foreign coefficient is economically significant as well. Firms with both state and 
foreign ownerships use 8.9% more external funds than firms without either ownership.  
Table 3 also presents which firm characteristics have consistent impacts on 
Fixed_External. Larger firms and/or exporting firms tend to use more external funds 
(Beck et al., 2008; Dong and Men, 2014; Knack and Xu, 2017). Older firms and/or 
ownership concentrated firms tend to use fewer external funds (Knack and Xu, 2017). 
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Manager experience, public status and locations have no significant impacts on external 
finance.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2. Endogeneity Tests 
The most important concern with the analysis above is endogeneity. Some 
unobserved/uncontrolled determinants of financing patterns may explain the existence 
of state/foreign ownership at the same time. Governments could either privatize better 
performed SOEs first in order to make an impression that the privatization process is 
successful, or privatize worse performed SOEs first in order to get rid of their historical 
burdens (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2007). 
Foreign investors may prefer to invest in firms with more informative financial 
reporting (e.g., Barth et al., 1999; Guedhami et al., 2009), or firms located at better 
institutional environments (Boubakri et al., 2005; 2007; Guedhami et al., 2009). To 
address the above specified issues, we employ three econometric methods: instrumental 
variable (IV) regression, propensity score matching (PSM), and Heckman selection 
model.  
 
4.2.1. Instrumental Variable Regression 
Two instrument variables (IVs) are employed in the section. First, we use the 
variable Collectivism, which equals 100 minus Hofstede's (2001) individualism index, 
as an IV for State. Boubakri et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2018) point out that the 
residual state ownership is higher in newly privatized firms that are located in less 
individualistic countries. Second, we calculate the average percent of Foreign for firms 
in the same country, industry and year of the target firm as Foreign_Expected. 
Assuming that a firm’s choice to bring in foreign investors is affected by the choices of 
firms similar to itself, we use Foreign_Expected as an IV for Foreign (Liu et al., 2014).  
We report IV regression results regarding state ownership in Columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 4, Panel A. In the first stage regression, we regress State on Collectivism along 
with the full set of control variables and country_industry, year fixed effects. Consistent 
with Boubakri et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2018), Collectivism enters positively and 
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significantly at the 1% level, indicating that the state ownership is more prevalent in 
collectivistic countries. The result of the second stage regression shows that state 
ownership is positively and significantly correlated with Fixed_External. We report IV 
regression results regarding foreign ownership in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, Panel 
B. In the first stage regression, Foreign_Expected is positively and significantly related 
with Foreign, suggesting the existence of a keeping-up with the Joneses effect. The 
result of the second stage regression indicates that foreign ownership is negatively and 
significantly correlated with Fixed_External.  
 
4.2.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
The PSM method matches the treated firms with controlled firms according to the 
observable firm characteristics, in order to randomize the sample selection process 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Although it is impossible to control all of the 
unobservable variables, PSM is an effective endogeneity control method in both 
experimental and non-experimental studies (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 
2001). 
In this study, the treatment is residual state ownership and foreign ownership, 
respectively. We first use the same set of firm level control variables and fixed effects 
in Equation (1) to estimate the propensity score of each firm having any state or foreign 
ownership. State (Foreign) firms are matched with Non_State_Foreign firms, according 
to their propensity scores. We then re-estimate Equation (1) using the matched sample. 
Results reported in Table 4, Panel A, Column (3) indicates that State is positively 
though insignificantly correlated with FA_External, and results reported in Table 4, 
Panel B, Column (3) indicates that Foreign is negatively and significantly correlated 
with Fixed_External. 
 
4.2.3. Heckman Two-Stage Analysis 
Following the literature (Hope et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; 
Boubakri and Saffar, 2019), we perform a Heckman two-stage analysis to address the 
sample selection concern.  
In the first stage, we use a probit model to predict whether state/foreign owners 
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choose to keep any stake in the firms. Specially, we regress State/Foreign on its 
corresponding instrument and the same set of firm level control variables and fixed 
effects in Equation (1), to estimate the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda). In the second stage, 
we include Lambda as an additional independent variable in Equation (1). The results 
in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4, Panel A (B), indicate that state (foreign) ownership 
is positively (negatively) and significantly associated with the external finance, which 
are consistent with the baseline regression. Lambda loads negatively significant at the 
1% level on Fixed_External in state ownership regression, suggesting the existence of 
selection issue and the Heckman analysis is needed. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5. Ownership and Detailed Finance Patterns 
5.1. Main Regression and Results 
In this study, we find that the firms with State (Foreign) firms are more (less) likely 
to seek and acquire external finance. State firms’ positive effect on external finance 
disappears when Foreign firms and the interaction of the two are taken into 
consideration. The positive effect of the state-foreign interaction on a firm’s external 
finance is both statistically and economically significant. We examine the detailed 
relationship between ownership and financing patterns in this section. 
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 +
𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀                             (2) 
Where Detailed Financing Patterns are proxied by Fixed_External, Fixed_Bank, 
Fixed_StateBank, Fixed_PrivateBank, Fixed_NonBank, Fixed_Suppliers, Fixed_Other, 
Fixed_NewEquity. Similar firm level controls, country-industry dummies, year 
dummies as shown in Equation (1) are also included in Equation (2). We only report 
the coefficients of State, Foreign and State_Foreign in Table 5, for the sake of brevity.  
We find that State firms have similar financing patterns in terms of Fixed_Bank, 
and Fixed_NonBank, compared with Non_State_Foreign firms. Although no significant 
difference in Fixed_Bank is observed between State firms and Non_State_Foreign 
firms, State firms are more likely to borrow from state-owned banks, and less likely 
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from privately-owned banks.4 State firms are also more likely to obtain supplier finance 
or other finance.  
Foreign firms are less likely to finance their fixed assets from banks, especially 
privately-owned banks, compared with their Non_State_Foreign counterparts. The 
coefficient of Foreign on Fixed_NewEquity is positively significant, consistent with the 
findings from Beck et al. (2008).  
The coefficient of State_Foreign on Fixed_Bank is positively significant. 
State_Foreign firms’ increased finance from banks seems to come from privately-
owned banks, instead of state-owned banks. State_Foreign firms also increase their 
finance from non-bank financial institutions and new equity to purchase fixed assets. 
The relationship stated above is also economically significant. Compared with 
Non_State_Foreign firms, State_Foreign firms increased their external financing of 
fixed assets by approximately 8.9%. 70% of the increased external finance comes from 
banks, and 30% of the increased external finance comes from new equity, 
approximately.  
In sum, we find that State_Foreign firms inherit some financing advantages, but not 
financing disadvantages, from their state owners and foreign owners. For example, 
State_Foreign firms acquire increased external finance through new equity, possibly 
from their foreign owners. Privately-owned banks are less likely to lend to State firms 
or Foreign firms, probably for different reasons, but much more likely to lend to 
State_Foreign firms.  
 [Table 5 here] 
 
5.2. Robustness Tests 
First, we try to further reduce the potential bias caused by firm level omitted 
variables. Self-reported finance, political and court obstacles are included in Equation 
(2). These obstacles are not included in the main regression since they are partially the 
results of state/foreign ownership. Including them in the main regression can move us 
further away from finding a causal relationship. However, these obstacles may exist 
                                                 
4 The number of observations in Fixed_StateBank and Fixed_PrivateBank is much smaller than the 
number of observations in other financing patterns. The low observation number may be the reason that 
the coefficient of State on Fixed_StateBank is positive but insignificant.  
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beyond the influence of ownership. The results reported in Table 6, Panel A indicate 
that State remains insignificant, Foreign remains negatively significant, and State-
Foreign remains positively significant.  
Second, we replaced country dummies with country-level macro variables 
(Ln_GDP, GDP Growth, GDP per Capita, and Inflation). Country level 
macroeconomic variables vary by time, instead of staying fixed. We can measure this 
change since many countries in our dataset are surveyed twice or more with a multiple-
year gap. The four macroeconomic variables specified above are commonly used in the 
international corporate finance literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008; 
D'Souza et al., 2017; Allison et. al., 2019). The results are reported in Table 6, Panel B. 
The main results regarding ownership remain unchanged.  
Third, we replicate Equation (2) using the top 10 state ownership countries, as these 
countries are more likely to benefit from introducing foreign investment to their firms 
with state ownership. The results are reported in Table 6, Panel C, with main results 
regarding ownership basically unchanged.  
Fourth, firms with residual state ownership or foreign ownership are likely to be 
larger than purely private firms. We limit our research to the large firm sample, which 
are firms with 100 or more employees according to WBES, as state ownership is 
generally concentrated in large firms. The results are similar to the results in Table 5 
and they are reported in Table 6, Panel D.   
Fifth, we employ alternative dependent variables in Equation (2). The alterative 
measures of financing patterns are WC_External, WC_Bank, WC_NonBank, 
WC_Suppliers, WC_Other5, Line_of_Credit and New_Loan.  As we have seen in Table 
5, State (Foreign) firms are insignificantly (negatively significantly) related with 
WC_External. State_Foreign firms continue to have positively significant effects on 
external finance.  
The results regarding Line_of_Credit and New_Loan further support the results in 
Table 5. Neither State firms nor Foreign firms are more likely to possess a line of credit 
or apply for a new loan. Yet State_Foreign firms are associated with a 11.5% higher 
probability of having a line of credit and an 8.3% higher probability of filing for a new 
                                                 
5 WC_External=WC_Bank+WC_NonBank+WC_Suppliers+WC_Other.  
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loan, compared with Non_State_Foreign firms. See Table 6, Panel E for details.  
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
 
6. The Channels between Ownership and Financing Patterns 
We explore two possible channels through which residual state ownership or 
foreign ownership could affect financing patterns. We choose three variables to proxy 
a firm’s market expansion process: Sales_Growth, Employee_Growth and 
Fixed_Dummy. Another three variables are used to proxy a firm’s innovation effort: 
New_Product, Improved_Process and R&D. Definitions of these variables are shown 
in Section 3.2.2. State, Foreign and State_Foreign are all included in the regression, 
with Non_State_Foreign as the default category. The firm level control variables, 
country-industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors clustering are the same as 
in Equations (1) and (2).  
We realize that ownership can affect financing patterns through other channels, such 
as corporate governance. Previous literature generally associates foreign ownership 
with better corporate governance (Coffee, 1999; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Boubakri 
et al., 2005), and state ownership with worse corporate governance (Boycko et al., 1996; 
Dyck, 2001; Boubakri et al.,2007; Doidge et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 2008). Firms with 
better corporate governance are more trustworthy borrowers in the eyes of both 
financial institutions and other potential lenders (Klock et al., 2005). Unluckily, we are 
not able to test this channel empirically due to data limitation.  
State and foreign owners may have different visions on a firm’s market expansion 
strategy. Table 7, Panel A reports the ownership-market expansion results. State is 
negatively related with Employee_Growth and Fixed_Dummy. Foreign is negatively 
related with Employee_Growth. The results regarding State and Foreign are consistent 
with the findings from Beck et al. (2005), D'Souza et al. (2017), and Ullah and Wei 
(2017). Nevertheless, State-Foreign is positively related with Sales_Growth, 
Employee_Growth and Fixed_Dummy. Firms with state-foreign ownerships are 
actively pursue market expansion, compared with their non-state-foreign counterparts.  
State and foreign owners may also have vastly different incentives regarding a 
firm’s innovation effort. Table 7, Panel B reports the ownership-innovation results. 
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State is negatively related with R&D. Foreign is positively related with New_Product, 
but not the other two measures. The results are consistent with Ayyagari et al. (2011), 
which document a negative (positive) relationship between state (foreign) ownership 
and firm innovation. State-Foreign is positively related with New_Product, 
Improved_Process and R&D, which indicates that firms with state-foreign ownerships 
are willing to take risks associated with innovation and engage in product research and 
development. 
[Table 7 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we focus on the ownership-finance relationship. Using a large dataset 
from over 130 countries, from 2006 and 2017, we find statistically and economically 
significant evidence that residual state (foreign) ownership is positively (negatively) 
related to external finance. More importantly, firms with both state and foreign 
ownerships have a higher usage of external finance, compared with firms without either 
ownership. The increased supply of external finance mainly comes from privately-
owned bank and new equity.  
Ownership may affect financing patterns through at least three channels, which are 
market expansion, innovation and corporate governance. We find some support from 
the first two channels. Firms with both state and foreign ownerships tend to actively 
engage in market expansion and innovation, which results in an increased demand of 
external fund. Unluckily, we do not have relevant variables to test the corporate 
governance channel.  
We conduct a set of endogeneity and robustness tests, the main ownership-finance 
relationship remains stable. We admit that the endogeneity issue is only relieved but 
not solved in this study, as the instrument variables we find for state/foreign ownership 
may not be totally exogenous.  
Our results have critical implications for policy makers. Firms with only state 
ownership tend to perform worse, invest less and expand less. Many governments want 
to change the behavior pattern of these firms but are not willing to relinquish control of 
them. The results of this study indicate that introducing foreign investment into State 
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firms could be a win-win solution. Firms with both state and foreign ownerships are 
financially supported by both owners, especially foreign owners, and (implicitly) 
politically supported by state owners. They become vigorous and start to expand in 
market and engage in innovation. The resources integration synergy between state and 
foreign ownerships seem to overweight the coordinating cost between them.  
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Figure 1A. Percentage of State-Owned Enterprises by Region. 
 
 
 
Figure 1B. Percentage of Foreign-Owned Enterprises by Region. 
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Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics. 
 N Mean Std Min Median Max 
              
  A. Financing Patterns 
Fixed_External 59250 33.20 40.54 0 0 100 
Fixed_Bank 58666 18.24 32.97 0 0 100 
Fixed_PrivateBank 16708 18.21 33.25 0 0 100 
Fixed_StateBank 16692 2.16 12.20 0 0 100 
Fixed_NonBank 52477 1.82 11.27 0 0 100 
Fixed_Suppliers 58762 5.17 17.92 0 0 100 
Fixed_Other 45281 2.47 12.92 0 0 100 
Fixed_NewEquity 58923 4.20 16.62 0 0 100 
WC_External 121703 28.90 34.17 0 12 100 
WC_Bank 120193 12.99 24.25 0 0 100 
WC_NonBank 120681 1.31 7.83 0 0 100 
WC_Suppliers 120266 11.72 22.23 0 0 100 
WC_Other 103325 2.78 12.21 0 0 100 
Line_of_Credit 131498 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
New_Loan 130073 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
              
  B. Channels 
Sales_Growth 100358 0.14 0.45 -1.07 0.09 2.57 
Employee_Growth 122812 0.05 0.18 -0.48 0 0.75 
Investment_Dummy 135102 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 
New_Product 84887 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 
Improved_Process 83247 0.43 0.50 0 0 1 
R&D 83553 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
              
  C. Ownership 
State 134248 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 
Foreign 134203 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
State_Foreign 134167 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 
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 N Mean Std Min Median Max 
  D. Firm-level Control and Macro Variables 
Experience 132685 17.35 11.12 0 15 90 
Ln_Employee 135616 3.25 1.36 1.10 3.00 7.17 
Ln_FirmAge 134562 2.69 0.75 0 2.71 5.83 
Top_Owner_Pct 129240 79.28 26.37 0.20 100 100 
Public 135506 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 
Exporter 135089 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 
City_Large 93395 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
City_Medium 93395 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
City_Small 93395 0.14 0.35 0 0 1 
Finance_Obstacle 131934 1.49 1.33 0 1 4 
Political_Obstacle 132359 1.63 1.47 0 1 4 
Court_Obstacle 124685 0.98 1.23 0 0 4 
Ln_GDP  135172 25.27 2.01 19.48 25.26 29.53 
GDP_Growth  135910 4.65 4.21 -26.05 5.25 29.32 
GDP_per_Capita  135172 8.00 1.06 5.39 7.94 10.87 
Inflation 134182 7.32 5.86 -35.84 6.97 59.22 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix.  
    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Fixed_External (1)                       
State (2) 0.03***                     
Foreign (3) -0.02*** 0.09***                   
Experience (4) 0.05*** -0.01*** -0.02***                 
Ln_Employee (5) 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.13***               
Ln_FirmAge (6) 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.45*** 0.28***             
Top_Owner_Pct (7) -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.26*** -0.15***           
Public (8) 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.02*** 0.18*** 0.10*** -0.12***         
Exporter (9) 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.35*** 0.14*** -0.14*** 0.07***       
City_Large (10) -0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.04***     
City_Medium (11) -0.01 0.00 0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** -0.31***   
City_Small (12) 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.06*** -0.25*** -0.20*** 
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Table 3. State/foreign Ownership and Financing Patterns. 
  Fixed_External Fixed_External Fixed_External Fixed_External 
State 3.465**   4.452*** 1.051 
  (2.04)   (2.62) (0.50) 
Foreign   -5.339*** -5.495*** -5.977*** 
    (-6.10) (-6.34) (-6.72) 
State_Foreign       8.920*** 
        (3.02) 
Experience -0.032 -0.039 -0.037 -0.038 
  (-1.21) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.44) 
Ln_Employee 1.509*** 1.765*** 1.749*** 1.782*** 
  (6.51) (7.37) (7.35) (7.53) 
Ln_FirmAge -1.105*** -1.199*** -1.242*** -1.237*** 
  (-3.04) (-3.30) (-3.44) (-3.43) 
Top_Owner_Pct -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
  (-3.54) (-3.81) (-3.69) (-3.64) 
Public -0.425 0.344 -0.001 0.030 
  (-0.40) (0.32) (-0.00) (0.03) 
Exporter 2.875*** 3.540*** 3.501*** 3.456*** 
  (4.23) (5.32) (5.28) (5.21) 
City_Large 0.519 0.473 0.471 0.469 
  (0.50) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) 
City_Medium 1.267 1.272 1.257 1.245 
  (1.19) (1.19) (1.17) (1.16) 
City_Small 2.376 2.329 2.356 2.358 
  (1.64) (1.60) (1.62) (1.62) 
          
Observations 33912 33919 33910 33910 
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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Table 4 Panel A. Endogeneity Test of State Ownership. 
Variables IV 1st IV 2nd PSM Heckman 1st Heckman 2nd 
 State Fixed_External Fixed_External State Fixed_External 
State  292.633*** 3.832  9.624*** 
  (6.80) (1.15)  (4.94) 
Collectivism 0.001***   0.027***  
 (4.98)   (8.37)  
Experience -0.000 0.028 0.016 -0.006** 0.057 
 (-1.60) (0.56) (0.12) (-2.37) (1.46) 
Ln_Employee 0.004** 0.072 1.998* 0.118*** -0.513 
 (2.29) (0.16) (1.73) (5.65) (-0.85) 
Ln_FirmAge 0.006*** -2.647*** -3.057* 0.212*** -3.825*** 
 (2.58) (-3.30) (-1.66) (4.86) (-4.30) 
Top_Owner_Pct -0.000*** 0.029 -0.141*** -0.008*** 0.033 
 (-3.97) (0.75) (-2.71) (-7.49) (1.03) 
Public 0.062*** -19.235*** -3.259 0.663*** -10.449*** 
 (6.00) (-4.34) (-1.05) (11.04) (-3.87) 
Exporter 0.019* -1.585 6.122** 0.296*** -0.332 
 (1.90) (-0.53) (2.22) (2.59) (-0.27) 
City_Large -0.005* 3.934** -2.159 -0.035 2.933** 
  (-1.77) (2.49) (-0.58) (-0.67) (2.22) 
City_Medium -0.004 1.468 -7.104* 0.015 0.019 
  (-0.84) (0.67) (-1.92) (0.18) (0.01) 
City_Small -0.007* 3.748 -6.708 0.058 0.966 
 (-1.79) (1.52) (-1.11) (0.69) (0.42) 
LAMBDA     -15.359*** 
     (-4.16) 
      
Observations 23088 23088 1197 57447 23088 
Adj. R-squared  -0.94 0.19  0.09 
1
st
 stage F test statistics  24.83    
1
st
 stage F test p value  0.00    
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Table 4 Panel B. Endogeneity Test of Foreign Ownership. 
Variables IV 1st IV 2nd PSM Heckman 1st Heckman 2nd 
 Foreign Fixed_External Fixed_External Foreign Fixed_External 
Foreign  -2.914 -3.655***  -5.751*** 
  (-0.34) (-3.30)  (-6.37) 
Foreign_Expected 0.939***   4.270***  
 (40.06)   (22.95)  
Experience -0.001*** -0.046 -0.022 -0.006*** -0.042 
 (-5.50) (-1.51) (-0.54) (-5.18) (-1.39) 
Ln_Employee 0.040*** 0.962 0.992** 0.221*** 0.823 
 (12.94) (1.46) (2.27) (18.82) (1.06) 
Ln_FirmAge -0.020*** -0.147 -0.143 -0.124*** -0.072 
 (-5.82) (-0.26) (-0.21) (-7.16) (-0.11) 
Top_Owner_Pct -0.000*** -0.054*** -0.049** -0.005*** -0.050** 
 (-2.93) (-3.27) (-2.38) (-8.75) (-2.51) 
Public 0.096*** 0.338 1.095 0.350*** 0.233 
 (6.59) (0.28) (0.70) (9.14) (0.20) 
Exporter 0.111*** 4.649*** 2.162** 0.593*** 4.273*** 
 (11.91) (4.59) (2.00) (17.54) (3.60) 
City_Large -0.007 0.812 0.462 -0.075** 0.889 
  (-1.27) (0.69) (0.28) (-2.39) (0.79) 
City_Medium -0.003 0.746 0.061 -0.096*** 0.881 
  (-0.42) (0.57) (0.03) (-2.80) (0.69) 
City_Small -0.014* 0.316 -1.842 -0.143*** 0.501 
 (-1.85) (0.18) (-0.77) (-3.31) (0.29) 
LAMBDA     -1.365 
     (-0.54) 
      
Observations 32935 32935 7534 79852 32935 
Adj. R-squared  0.02 0.13  0.06 
1
st
 stage F test statistics  1605.09    
1
st
 stage F test p value  0.00    
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Table 5. Ownership and Detailed Financing Patterns. 
  Fixed_External 
Fixed_ 
Bank 
Fixed_ 
PrivateBank 
Fixed_ 
StateBank 
Fixed_ 
NonBank 
Fixed_ 
Suppliers Fixed_Other 
Fixed_ 
NewEquity 
State 1.051 -1.737 -9.290*** 3.472 0.429 1.598** 1.817* 0.644 
  (0.50) (-1.02) (-4.07) (1.42) (0.69) (1.98) (1.92) (0.66) 
Foreign -5.977*** -6.586*** -4.173** -1.242 -0.320 0.165 -0.371 0.657* 
  (-6.72) (-9.29) (-2.38) (-1.45) (-1.28) (0.46) (-1.64) (1.80) 
State_Foreign 8.920*** 6.936*** 12.848** -4.260 1.769* 1.056 -0.359 2.868** 
  (3.02) (2.86) (1.99) (-1.12) (1.80) (0.84) (-0.23) (2.17) 
                  
Observations 33910 33399 4891 4890 29487 33632 30972 33630 
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 
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Table 6. Robustness Tests. 
  Fixed_External 
Fixed_ 
Bank 
Fixed_ 
PrivateBank 
Fixed_ 
StateBank 
Fixed_ 
NonBank 
Fixed_ 
Suppliers Fixed_Other 
Fixed_ 
NewEquity 
Panel A: Add finance, political, and court obstacles. 
State 1.482 -0.934 -7.652*** 4.164 0.264 1.620* 2.382** 0.035 
  (0.68) (-0.49) (-3.25) (1.36) (0.46) (1.88) (2.26) (0.03) 
Foreign -5.119*** -6.406*** -4.632** -1.196 -0.148 0.343 -0.277 0.903** 
  (-5.63) (-8.76) (-2.47) (-1.35) (-0.57) (0.91) (-1.27) (2.36) 
State_Foreign 8.167*** 6.270** 11.667* -4.450 2.119** 1.155 -0.733 3.206** 
  (2.61) (2.37) (1.73) (-1.00) (2.16) (0.83) (-0.45) (2.48) 
                  
Observations 31078 30619 4355 4354 27133 30807 28275 30804 
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Panel B: Replace country fixed effects with macro variables. 
State 5.490** -2.676 -11.475*** 5.939** -0.044 1.879** 2.443** 1.101 
  (2.37) (-1.48) (-4.98) (2.20) (-0.07) (2.11) (2.19) (1.03) 
Foreign -6.694*** -7.834*** -4.655** -1.586* -0.317 0.399 -0.288 0.094 
  (-6.72) (-10.83) (-2.60) (-1.69) (-1.32) (1.13) (-1.33) (0.26) 
State_Foreign 14.914*** 2.675 14.597** -6.192 1.886** 1.360 2.177 3.372** 
  (4.38) (1.01) (2.27) (-1.59) (1.99) (1.04) (1.37) (2.44) 
                  
Observations 32926 32416 4691 4690 28592 32649 29991 32647 
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Panel C: Top 10 State ownership countries. 
State 1.879 -2.257 -6.952** 3.157 -0.256 3.229** 1.967 2.429* 
  (0.64) (-0.92) (-2.18) (0.74) (-0.47) (2.04) (1.06) (1.90) 
Foreign -3.626 -4.377** 8.665 -2.227 0.446 -0.666 -1.169 1.208 
  (-1.24) (-2.17) (1.59) (-0.52) (0.68) (-0.69) (-1.32) (0.89) 
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  Fixed_External 
Fixed_ 
Bank 
Fixed_ 
PrivateBank 
Fixed_ 
StateBank 
Fixed_ 
NonBank 
Fixed_ 
Suppliers Fixed_Other 
Fixed_ 
NewEquity 
State_Foreign 11.041** 8.755** -15.495* -11.040 2.085** 0.350 0.464 3.088 
  (2.14) (2.41) (-1.96) (-1.43) (2.15) (0.17) (0.13) (1.12) 
                  
Observations 3525 3524 490 490 3029 3521 2760 3519 
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Panel D: Large firm sample. 
State -0.622 -1.281 -9.059** 5.972 -0.525 1.462 1.498 -2.348*** 
  (-0.19) (-0.44) (-2.52) (1.33) (-0.67) (1.16) (1.59) (-2.83) 
Foreign -7.501*** -8.492*** -2.794 -2.741** -0.017 0.555 -0.460 0.273 
  (-5.90) (-8.02) (-0.86) (-2.07) (-0.05) (0.88) (-1.58) (0.45) 
State_Foreign 12.176*** 8.562** 4.682 -2.648 0.072 0.660 -0.564 5.208** 
  (2.59) (2.20) (0.56) (-0.39) (0.06) (0.29) (-0.34) (2.28) 
                  
Observations 8444 8271 1390 1389 7067 8326 7764 8330 
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Panel E: Alterative measures of financing patterns. 
  WC_External WC_Bank WC_NonBank WC_Suppliers WC_Other 
Line_of_ 
Credit New_Loan   
State 3.114 -1.083 1.321*** 0.396 2.378*** -0.069*** -0.050***   
  (1.62) (-0.81) (3.00) (0.54) (2.93) (-3.79) (-2.68)   
Foreign -3.024*** -3.932*** 0.094 0.601 0.059 -0.084*** -0.067***   
  (-4.20) (-7.67) (0.69) (1.64) (0.32) (-9.04) (-8.42)   
State_Foreign 13.806*** 7.424*** 2.303** 2.365* 1.910* 0.115*** 0.083***   
  (4.15) (4.33) (2.31) (1.66) (1.84) (3.81) (2.92)   
                  
Observations 73401 72079 72519 72587 72512 80549 79974   
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.15   
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Table 7. Ownership and Financing Patterns-Channel Analysis. 
 Panel A: Market Expansion 
  
Sales_ 
Growth 
Employee_ 
Growth 
Investment_ 
Dummy 
State 0.001 -0.031*** -0.097*** 
 (0.07) (-4.63) (-4.44) 
Foreign -0.006 -0.011*** -0.005 
 (-0.92) (-3.98) (-0.73) 
State_Foreign 0.155** 0.042*** 0.150*** 
 (2.02) (3.23) (5.22) 
    
Observations 62597 76252 81700 
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.09 0.15 
 Panel B: Innovation 
  New_Product 
Improved_ 
Process R&D 
State -0.025 -0.051 -0.048** 
 (-1.00) (-1.64) (-2.04) 
Foreign 0.021** 0.007 0.010 
 (2.33) (0.86) (1.17) 
State_Foreign 0.077** 0.129*** 0.095*** 
 (1.98) (3.32) (2.97) 
    
Observations 60463 59183 59368 
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.21 0.17 
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Appendix 1. Variable Definitions and Sources. 
Variable Definition (t is the survey year) Source 
      
  A. Financing Patterns   
Fixed_External 100-the percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: retained earnings. WBES(k5a) 
Fixed_Bank The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: bank borrowing. WBES(k5bc) 
Fixed_PrivateBank The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: private bank borrowing. WBES(k5b) 
Fixed_StateBank The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: state-owned bank borrowing. WBES(k5c) 
Fixed_NonBank The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: non-bank financial institutions. WBES(k5e) 
Fixed_Suppliers The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: credit from suppliers. WBES(k5f) 
Fixed_Other The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: other (money lenders\friends\relatives). WBES(k5hdj) 
Fixed_NewEquity The percent of the firm's fixed assets funded by: issued new equity. WBES(k5i) 
WC_External 100-the percent of the firm's working capital funded by: retained earnings. WBES(k3a) 
WC_Bank The percent of the firm's working capital funded by: bank borrowing. WBES(k3bc) 
WC_NonBank The percent of the firm's working capital funded by: non-bank financial institutions. WBES(k3e) 
WC_Suppliers The percent of the firm's working capital funded by: credit from suppliers. WBES(k3f) 
WC_Other The percent of the firm's working capital funded by: other (money lenders\friends\relatives). WBES(k3hd) 
Line_of_Credit 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm has a line of credit or loan from a financial 
institution, 0 otherwise.  WBES(k8) 
New_Loan 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm has applied for new loans or lines of credit in 
year t-1, 0 otherwise.  WBES(k16) 
      
  B. Channels   
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Variable Definition (t is the survey year) Source 
Sales_Growth 
(Ln(Salest-1) - Ln(Salest-3))/2 
WBES(d2 and 
n3) 
Employee_Growth (Ln(Employeet-1) - Ln(Employeet-3))/2 
WBES(l1 and 
l2) 
Investment_Dummy 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm has purchased any fixed assets in year t-1, 0 
otherwise. WBES(k4) 
New_Product 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm introduced new products/services over last 3 
years, 0 otherwise. WBES(h1) 
Improved_Process 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm introduced new/significantly improved 
process during last 3 years, 0 otherwise. WBES(h5) 
R&D 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the establishment spent on R&D (excl market 
research), 0 otherwise. WBES(h8) 
      
  C. Ownership   
State 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm is at least partially owned by government or 
state, 0 otherwise. WBES(b2c) 
Foreign 
Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm is at least partially owned by private foreign 
individuals, companies or organizations, 0 otherwise.  WBES(b2b) 
State_Foreign The interaction term of State*Foreign. 
WBES(b2b and 
b2c) 
      
  D. Firm-level Control and Macro Variables   
Experience The top manager's number of years of experience working in this sector. WBES(b7) 
Ln_Employee Ln(Employeet-3) WBES(l2) 
Ln_FirmAge Ln(survey year–firm founding year+1)  WBES(b5) 
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Variable Definition (t is the survey year) Source 
Top_Owner_Pct The percent of the firm owned by the largest shareholder. WBES(b3) 
Public Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm is publicly listed, 0 otherwise.  WBES(b1) 
Exporter Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm exports, 0 otherwise.  WBES(d3a) 
City_Large The city that firm located with population over 250,000 to 1 million. WBES(a3) 
City_Medium The city that firm located with  population over 50,000 to 250,000.  WBES(a3) 
City_Small The city that firm located with  population less than 50,000.  WBES(a3) 
Finance_Obstacle Categorical variable, used to measure “how much of an obstacle: access to finance?”  WBES(k30) 
Political_Obstacle Categorical variable, used to measure “how much of an obstacle: political instability?”  WBES(j30e) 
Court_Obstacle Categorical variable, used to measure “how much of an obstacle: courts?”  WBES(h30) 
Ln_GDP  The logarithm of GDP (constant 2010 US$). WDI 
GDP_Growth  Growth of GDP (%). WDI 
GDP_per_Capita  The logarithm GDP of per capita (constant 2010 US$). WDI 
Inflation Inflation rate (%). WDI 
      
 
 
 
 
 
